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Introduction
Since the concept of human resource manage-
ment (HRM) became popular in the 1980s there
have been numerous studies which have tried to
measure developments towards its prescriptions.
Most of this research has been conducted in
countries with few institutional constraints, such
as the UK and the USA. Relatively little is known
about the use of HRM practices in countries with
strong statuatory regulations. 
A particularly interesting case for a study of
HRM in institutional constraints is Germany.
Arguably, over the last decade German companies
have been among the most successful in the
world. If, as the HRM literature claims, the
management of human resources is crucial for
business success, then it should at least partly
explain the success of the German economy.
Companies in Germany have to operate within a
system characterized by statutory constraints. The
key labour-market institutions of multi-employer
bargaining, co-determination and initial voca-
tional training in particular restrict managerial
autonomy. A high percentage of the German
workforce is covered by multi-employer collective
bargaining. This significantly determines pay as
well as other terms and conditions. The German
system of co-determination restricts organizational
autonomy. Furthermore, the system of initial
vocational training exerts considerable pressure
on companies to provide skill formation on their
lines (Muller, 1997b).
One of the most frequently cited accounts of
human resource (HR) practices in Germany is 
the study of Lawrence (1982). Based on visits 
British Journal of Management, Vol. 10, S31–S44 (1999)
Human Resource Management under
Institutional Constraints: 
The Case of Germany1
Michael Muller
De Montfort University, School of Business, Department of Human Resource Management, 
The Gateway, Leicester LE1 9BH, UK
Most human resource management (HRM) research has been conducted in countries
that have relatively weak labour market institutions such as the UK and the USA.
There is little research about the scope for and constraints on the adoption of HRM
practices in countries with strong statutory regulations. The research presented here is
based on 16 case studies of banks and chemical firms operating in Germany, that
comply with the requirements of the German labour market institutions of collective
bargaining, co-determination and initial vocational training, and hence operate under
strong institutional constraints. The evidence presented shows that institutional features
of the German system encourage the implementation of some ingredients of the HRM
‘recipe’ and inhibit others. It also indicates that constraining influences notwithstanding,
a pluralist version of HRM appears to be quite compatible with the highly regulated
German context.
© 1999 British Academy of Management
1 I thank David Guest for his extensive support and
encouragement. Thanks also go to Pawan Budhwar,
Anthony Ferner, Howard Gospel, Riccardo Peccei 
and the participants of the 1998 annual conference of
the British Academy of Management for comments 
on earlier versions of this paper. Any errors are the
author’s own.
of twelve (manufacturing) companies in West-
Berlin he suggested that labour-market institutions
strongly influence the German HR function. The
system of central collective bargaining means that
managers are not directly involved in collective
bargaining negotiations, that the works councils
condition their activities in such a way that they
become reactive, and that the initial vocational
training system leads to a preoccupation with
training. Although, Lawrence’s 1982 research
could be somewhat outdated, it is important, as it
suggests that German labour-market institutions
deter firms operating in Germany from using
innovative HR techniques. This would mean that
practices which over the last decade have been
discussed under the term ‘HRM’ cannot or cannot
easily be applied in Germany. This assessment
contradicts the notion that firms in Germany have
already achieved the HRM goals of commitment,
flexibility and quality for a long time (Garnjost
and Wächter, 1996; Hendry, 1991). Nevertheless,
there is little empirical research that can answer
the question whether the highly-regulated German
context encourages or inhibits the implemen-
tation of the conventional HRM ‘recipe’ (Muller,
1999a). 
The data presented here aim to throw more
light on this issue. In order to do this, it is neces-
sary to define and operationalize what we mean
by HRM techniques. The classic statements by
Beer et al. (1984) and Walton (1985) mention a
number of HRM practices. Since then various
lists of practices associated with HRM have been
drawn up (for recent lists by US researchers see
Huselid, 1995; Pfeffer, 1998; Youndt et al., 1996
and by UK researchers see Brewster and
Hegewisch, 1994, pp. 247–273; Guest and Hoque,
1994; Storey, 1992; Wood and Albanese, 1995).
Although some of the indicators presented in
these check lists, such as employment security,
single status and high investment in training ap-
pear to be commonly accepted by most academics
that have drawn up inventories of HRM practices,
there is, as Guest (1997, p. 266) pointed out, still a
lack of ‘a coherent theoretical basis for classifying
HRM policy and practice’. HRM still appears 
to be an academically constructed stereotype
that is a convenient shorthand for a number of
practices. In the absence of a commonly agreed
list this research will use Guest’s (1987) HR
policy goals of commitment, flexibility, quality
and strategic integration, to judge whether a
particular practice is a HRM technique or not
(Muller, 1999b). 
The research context
This paper is based on 16 case studies of large
firms operating in Germany that comply with the
requirements of multi-employer collective bargain-
ing, initial vocational training and works council
co-determination. Hence, they guarantee their
workforce the minimum terms and conditions of
the collective bargaining agreement negotiated by
an employers’ association on their behalf. Also,
they normally have works councils in all their
establishments. Furthermore, they employ a sig-
nificant number of apprentices in initial vocational
training. Half of the sample firms are banks and
the other half chemical firms (see Table 1). Where-
as the majority of them are German-owned, two
are US- and three UK-owned. All but one of
these organizations have a German workforce of
at least 1000 employees. The exceptional case,
Savings Bank Borken, is closely integrated into
the savings bank group, which organizes most of
their training courses and gives advice on HR
issues. All companies are based in former West
Germany.
For the data collection, multiple sources of evi-
dence were used, most importantly visits to each
sample firm and in-depth interviews. Between
autumn 1991 and autumn 1994, I talked at least
once to eight heads of personnel departments, 44
other HR managers and nine works councillors
while visiting the 16 sample firms. Altogether the
study is based on 71 face-to-face and 41 follow-up
telephone interviews. All firms were visited at
least twice. Given the objective and the aims of
the study an open, semistructured interview style
was used. Besides taking notes, most interviews
were tape-recorded. About half of them were
transcribed later, and in the remaining cases the
notes were edited immediately after the interview.
During the visits, respondents were encouraged
to offer internal publications. This primary evi-
dence in the form of company newsletters, works
agreements, guiding principles of management
and appraisal forms was a second source of in-
formation. A third source was secondary pub-
lished data about the sample firms. This included
annual reports and descriptions of HR policies
and practices by managers in practitioner journals.
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The collection of information from different
sources made it possible to validate the claims of
the respondents. For this purpose the researcher
also interviewed 16 experts from trade unions,
consultants and employers’ associations. In
autumn 1994, the final drafts of the case studies
were fed back to the key informant in each firm,
who were asked to check the factual accuracy.
Depending on the material gathered these cases
were up to 10 000 words long. This respondent
validation (Yin, 1989, p. 41) enhanced the con-
struct validity of the case-study research. 
The following presentation of the data exam-
ines whether the sample firms achieve the HR
policy goals of commitment, flexibility, quality
and strategic integration (Guest, 1987). It starts
with selection and induction, then turns to train-
ing, appraisal and employment security and eventu-
ally debates pay, communication and quality
management. All of these are arguably key HR
areas and are usually included in the above
checklists of HRM practices. 
Selection and induction
Guest (1987, p. 515) suggested that considerable
attention must be given to recruitment and induc-
tion in order to ensure a high quality of staff. If
selection policies aim to select highly committed
and flexible people, they can help to achieve the
HR outcomes of commitment and flexibility.
Induction should be an important element of
HRM, since the introduction of newly-recruited
employees into the culture of a company can
foster their commitment to the organization.
The main criteria used by this study to assess
the importance firms attach to the selection of
new staff is their use of formal selection methods
such as tests and assessment centres. The first step
in the selection process in all sample firms is the
analysis of application forms. These usually in-
clude a curriculum vitae, school reports, academic
records and references of former employers. In
addition to this written information, the companies
conduct at least one interview with the most prom-
ising candidates. Commonly, this is with a HR
manager and the supervisor of the job in ques-
tion. For non-managerial employees, the selection
decision is usually based on this data. This also
largely applies for externally recruited managers,
although the number of interviews on which
recruitment decisions are based increases with
the hierarchical level of the vacancy. Assessment
centres are generally only used for the selection
of management trainees, and written tests only
for the selection of school leavers. 
One reason for the sparing use of formal tests
could be that most of the applicants will have an
initial and sometimes also a further vocational
training qualification. As these qualifications are
standardized, employers can make relatively safe
assumptions about the potential of the applicant.
Application papers of candidates for management
trainee schemes, and in particular for apprentice-
ships, are obviously less informative than those of
applicants with previous work experience, which
explains why the next stage of the selection pro-
cess needs to be more sophisticated for these two
groups of employees. In addition, the concentra-
tion on the selection of apprentices and graduates
is compatible with an internal labour-market policy
favoured by most of the firms in the sample. A
second explanation for the less widespread use of
formal tests could be co-determination rights.
Employee representatives can resist the introduc-
tion of tests. In one of the sample firms the works
council stopped the introduction of assessment
centres for the selection of management trainees.
The reason for this was that the works council
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Table 1. The sample firms
Banks German employees Chemical Firms German employees 
at end of 1993 at end of 1993
Deutsche Bank 59 900 Hoechst 85 800
Dresdner Bank 44 300 Henkel 17 800
Hypo Bank 16 000 E. Merck 10 000
West LB Bank 7 000 Beiersdorf 6 000
Citibank Privatkunden 3 600 Veba Oil 5 000
Apotheker und Ärzte Bank 1 900 Procter & Gamble 8 900
Trinkaus & Burkhard Bank 1 000 ICI 1 900
Savings Bank Borken 600 Glaxo 1 400
opposed the increased recruitment of employees
with a university degree. Employee representa-
tives were worried that this could reduce the
career prospects of employees that do not have
this qualification.
Turning to induction, there are several means
to communicate values to new staff. As it is
difficult to access the use of informal induction
methods such as assistance by supervisors and
colleagues, the analysis concentrates on structured
induction. Arguably the most valuable group of
newly-recruited employees taken in on a large
scale by an organization operating an internal
labour market system is of management trainees.
Most of the companies in the sample offer a
structured induction training for graduates, which
lasts between a few months and four years. In this
period, the participants rotate through different
departments, observe experienced employees,
work on projects and/or participate in specific off-
the-job training courses or meetings for this
group. Most of the firms also have an off-the-job
induction course for apprentices. Such courses are
less commonly used for other groups of em-
ployees. Thus it seems that not much has changed
since the early 1980s, when Kieser (1990) found
that formal induction methods are hardly used for
newly-recruited clerical or managerial staff, and
that learning by doing is by far the most import-
ant induction tool. 
Whereas the researcher observed no major
changes in regard to selection, among the
German-owned banks in particular there was a
development from generalist trainee schemes
during which newly-recruited graduates rotate 
for two or three years through all functions of the
bank, to shorter and more function-specific
schemes. Furthermore, over recent years German
banks had recruited more graduates directly for
specific jobs. This change appeared to be driven
by the graduates who are often in their late
twenties when they finish their studies, and are
less and less interested in starting their career
with a year or more of a general vocational train-
ing. Another development was that in the early
1990s three of the sample firms introduced induc-
tion courses for employees who do not start a
trainee scheme or an initial vocational training.
Concluding this section, it appears that most
companies in the sample place a special emphasis
on the selection and induction of apprentices 
and management trainees. This is in line with a
preference for internal labour markets. Of piv-
otal importance is the German system of initial
vocational training. This provides newly-recruited
school leavers with a careful induction. Addition-
ally, as this training is standardized, it makes it
less important to test the technical knowledge 
of employees with such a qualification. Co-
determination has some impact on selection and
induction, as works councils have the power to
influence the design of selection instruments.
Taken together, the evidence presented suggests
that most companies in the sample are relatively
close to HRM prescriptions with regard to the
selection and induction of newly-recruited school
leavers and graduates. However, there appears
to be a relative neglect of other groups of
employees. 
Training
The second HRM policy area to be discussed is
training. High investment in training is often
mentioned as a pivotal part of HRM (Guest,
1993; Hendry, 1994, p. 223; Storey, 1992). This is
not surprising as it can have a direct influence on
the HRM goal of ‘high quality staff’. Also it can
contribute to functional flexibility, if it leads to
multi-skilling. 
If one believes annual reports, mission state-
ments and image brochures, German firms invest
a lot in training. These publications often contain
commitments to the provision of training. Consid-
ering these commitments as well as the import-
ance of initial vocational training in Germany
(Backes-Gellner, 1996), it is not surprising that all
sample firms employ apprentices in clerical and/
or manual occupations. For a period which norm-
ally is between two and three years apprentices
are trained on-the-job, off-the-job in company
specific courses and in vocational schools. Those
who do not leave voluntarily after the completion
of the initial vocational training, i.e. to study at
university, are usually retained and offered a job
in the company.
In addition to initial vocational training there is
also a system of further vocational qualifications.
National standardized certified courses provide
employees with intermediate skills. These quali-
fications are important for those employees with
an initial vocational training that want to progress
to a supervisory position. The ‘Certified Foreperson’
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(Industriemeister) and the ‘Artisan Foreperson’
(Handwerksmeister) are well known (Lane, 1989).
In addition, there are similar qualifications in com-
mercial occupations such as business management
assistant. All sample firms support those em-
ployees who study for further training qualifica-
tions. Nevertheless, the investment in this training
is limited, as a company usually only refunds part
of the course fees, gives some release from work
duties and pays a bonus after the successful com-
pletion of the exam. 
Turning to company-specific training, off-the-
job training is usually divided between technical
and non-technical training. With the exception 
of courses on computer technology and foreign
languages, the technical training in both industries
differs. In the chemical firms safety, environment
protection, chemistry and mechanical engineering
are popular course topics. In the pharmaceutical
firms the training of sales representatives is crucial.
Technical training in banks is concentrated on the
selling of bank services. In addition to technical
training, all sample firms have specific courses for
managers. 
With the exception of apprentice ratios, which
in most sample firms declined significantly in the
early 1990s, the recession at that time did not seem
to have had an adverse impact on training expend-
iture. Survey evidence indicates that, whereas the
investment of chemical firms in training is similar
to the one of West German industry as a whole,
banks invest well in excess of the average in
industry (Bundesministerium für Bildung und
Wissenschaft, 1993, p. 119). As training costs are
calculated differently in various countries, it is
somewhat difficult to compare quantitative data.
Nevertheless, comparisons of training patterns of
banks suggest that German banks invest more in
initial and further vocational training than banks
in the UK and the USA (Muller, 1997a). 
Some change, though not so much in the extent
of training as in its form and focus, was observed.
There were attempts to integrate on-the-job and
off-the-job training more closely, as there was a
perception that off-the-job courses do not neces-
sarily result in behavioural changes, especially if
the environment does not facilitate this process.
One example is team training for all employees
working together in a department, branch or pro-
ject. Whereas in the 1980s only one of the sample
firms offered such training, six introduced it in 
the early 1990s. There also seemed to be a bigger
emphasis on job rotation between functions. This
is, at least for managers, one of the most import-
ant forms of on-the-job training. Traditionally,
employees in Germany start in a certain function
where, by and large, they will remain until the end
of their career (Handy, 1991, p. 37, Stewart et al.,
1994). Several of the HR managers interviewed
claimed that over recent years horizontal job
rotation has become more important in their
companies. 
Legal and institutional regulations restrict
organizational autonomy with regard to general
vocational training qualifications. To some extent
this also applies for company-specific further train-
ing. Employee representatives have rights regard-
ing the introduction and change of training courses
as well as access to them. Over the last decade
several empirical studies have shown that works
councillors hardly use these rights (for a review
of this literature see Auer, 1994; Breisig, 1993,
pp. 15–18; Grass, 1997; Sadowski, Backes-Gellner
and Frick, 1995). Nevertheless, we came across
several examples where employee representatives
have influenced training policies. In a branch of
one of the largest banks, the works council rigidly
controlled access to training courses. This made it
extremely difficult for management to organize
these courses. The central works council of another
bank initially blocked the introduction of a
computer-based training course that included a
test, on the grounds that this would put undue
pressure on employees. The employee represen-
tatives only agreed when the software was changed
in a way that the trainers only got information on
whether a participant had passed or not passed
the course, and not his or her detailed test results.
From a manager of another bank I know that
employee representatives were initially against
team training. Only when management changed
its name from ‘Organizationsentwicklung’ (organ-
izational development) to the less controversial
term ‘Teamentwicklung’ (team development) did
the works council give up its resistance. However,
despite these restrictions employee representa-
tives generally seem to support the extensive
provision of training.
All in all, the sample firms appear to invest
extensively in training, and therefore generally
fulfil this HRM prescription. Banks seem to do
this even more than chemical firms. Although there
are changes in the form and focus of the training
provided, the extent remains relatively stable.
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The initial vocational-training system obviously
has an impact, as it fosters the provision of this
training. Although works councils have co-
determination rights in this area, they usually do
not use them extensively. 
Appraisal
Appraisals, the third HRM policy dimension to be
assessed, play an important role in the assessment
of staff. They can, for example, be used to identify
training needs and therefore help to achieve the
HRM goal of ‘quality workforce’. They also give
employees feedback about their performance. 
If this feedback is positive, and if the appraisal 
is linked to the promotion and remuneration
system, it can contribute to the HRM goal of
commitment. 
Most of the sample firms regularly operate a
written performance-appraisal system. Whereas
in the past this was usually based on a trait
rating, in recent years most of them have ex-
tended their appraisal system by introducing
new elements such as MBO-appraisals, career-
development talks and management-development
assessment centres. The main reason for this
appears to be a dissatisfaction with the trad-
itional personality and trait-rating system’s ability
to accurately assess performance and career-
development prospects. Career-development talks,
management-development assessment centres
and development schemes are also introduced to
identify candidates with leadership skills and/or
develop these skills. This is a break with the past,
where progression has depended more on tech-
nical skills than leadership qualities. 
Whereas the traditional rating-appraisal sys-
tems tended to cover all staff, the new elements
are often targeted at managers only. Hence they
do not fulfil the HRM criteria ‘appraisal of all
staff’. One reason for this could be that exempt
staff (see later) and executives are arguably the
most valuable resources of an organization, and
therefore need special attention. Another reason
that emerged from the case studies is that works
councils have a potentially decisive influence on
the shape of an appraisal system. The intro-
duction or change of appraisal schemes can fail if
employee representatives cannot be persuaded
that it will not be used to the disadvantage of
employees. In one of the banks, employee
representatives blocked the introduction of a
goal-setting appraisal on the grounds that this
would be a waste of energy, and that it would
increase pressure on employees. For this reason,
management implemented this appraisal only for
exempt staff, as the works council has limited co-
determination rights for this group of employees.
The need to negotiate the introduction of an
appraisal system with employee representatives
could explain why the 1992 Cranfield survey found
that German private-sector organizations were
among those least likely to have performance-
appraisal systems (Brewster and Hegewisch, 1994:
Table 5.10). 
In summary, most of the sample firms operate
sophisticated appraisal systems. In recent years
several of them have introduced new appraisal
techniques. However, as performance appraisal is
an issue on which employee representatives are
particularly critical, some of the sample firms
have experienced restrictions of their managerial
autonomy in this area.
Employment stability
Employment stability and an emphasis on internal
labour markets are pivotal parts of many HRM
prescriptions. The rationale is that employees of
firms that promote from within and guarantee
employment security are committed to their com-
pany (Wood and Albanese, 1995). An indicator
for such a policy would be the existence of an
internal job-posting system and a preference for
internal promotion. One would also expect that
companies practising HRM avoid compulsory re-
dundancies. Each of these areas will be examined
in turn.
All firms in the sample have a system of job
posting and usually advertise all vacant positions
in the establishment first. Survey evidence con-
firms that internal job-posting systems are widely
used in Germany, particularly by large firms
(Mendius and Semlinger, 1991, p. 18). Most firms
have also committed themselves in written docu-
ments to a policy of internal promotion. Deutsche
Bank, for example, has done this in its manage-
ment guidelines. There it is stated that ‘through a
systematic HR development we aim to fill all
vacant positions internally if possible’. In the five
sample firms where such a commitment does 
not exist, the researcher was also told about an
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internal promotion policy, albeit not noted in
company brochures.
A preference for internal promotion should be
reflected in a low labour turnover. The inform-
ants in most companies in the sample were not
willing to provide a detailed figure for their
labour turnover, and claimed that this is about or
below the industry average. More detailed data is
available for commercial banks. This shows that
in the first half of the 1990s, total labour turnover
of employees covered by collective agreements at
sectoral level was on average 9%. The redundancy
rate itself was about 3%. Since 1992, commercial
banks in Germany have reduced employment.
This has not led to an increase in dismissals.
Instead it was achieved by voluntary redun-
dancies and early retirement (Muller, 1997a). 
As in the case of banks, the commitment of em-
ployers in the German chemical industry towards
stable employment had not been tested for a
decade, as employment in this industry increased
steadily between 1982 and 1991. This, however,
changed in 1992. Since then all chemical firms
have had to reduce their workforce significantly.
The reductions were achieved by a combination
of halting recruitment, early retirement and
voluntary redundancies. It was emphasized by the
interview partners that compulsory redundancies
were not used, or if they were, then only in ex-
ceptional cases. This information is confirmed by
similar statements collected from annual reports
and more detailed information from Hoechst.
Between 1991 and 1994 the parent company of
this large chemical concern reduced its 50 000
strong workforce to 40 000. During these years
the redundancy rate was on average 6.2%. More
than 80% of the reduction was accounted for by
early retirement; only 7% were compulsory, and
12% voluntary redundancies. Survey evidence
confirms that German companies tend to avoid
compulsory redundancies (Brewster and Hegewisch,
1994, Table 9.6; Mosley and Kruppe, 1992).
German institutions, at least partly, seem to
ensure that firms operating in Germany follow a
policy of employment stability. The labour law
makes dismissals more difficult than, for example,
in the UK. In addition, works councils can de-
mand an internal job-posting for vacant positions,
and also have a say in recruitment and dismissal
decisions. Thus they exert at least some pressure
on management to use internal labour markets.
The system of initial vocational training could
also explain why companies operating in German
prefer internal labour markets. They do not only
have an incentive to recover their investment by
retaining apprentices, but the qualifications gen-
erated by initial vocational training enable them
to follow a strategy of functional flexibility to
adjust to fluctuations in employment. 
Taken together, the data presented in this
section indicates that the sample firms generally
guarantee employment stability and emphasize
internal labour markets. The recession which at
the time of this research had affected the chem-
ical industry did not appear to change this behav-
iour significantly. Such a policy seems to be
fostered by the institutional environment. 
Pay
HRM prescriptions tend to favour performance-
related over job or person-based pay systems
(see, for example, Mahoney, 1992). Although 
the effectiveness of performance-related pay has
been questioned (Kessler and Purcell, 1992), it
was a major focus of activities within HRM in 
the UK in the early 1990s (Guest, 1993). The
reason for its popularity among managers is that
performance-related pay is perceived to increase
financial flexibility, to undermine collective bar-
gaining, to strengthen the role of the line manager
and to enhance employee commitment to the
organization (Legge, 1995, p. 167). Nevertheless,
besides contingent pay, basic compensation is 
also important. It must be adequate to attract and
retain a committed, cooperative and involved
workforce (Kochan and Dyer, 1995, p. 336).
An examination of pay in the German context
has to distinguish between tariff and exempt
employees (Außertarifliche Angestellte). Whereas
tariff employees are fully covered by collective-
bargaining agreements, exempts are only indir-
ectly affected. All those employees who earn
significantly more than the highest base salary
prescribed by the collective bargaining agreement
are exempt. Two extreme cases excluded, the
average exempt ratio in the sample firms is 18%.
Starting with tariff employees, collective bargain-
ing has a strong influence on their remuneration.
Collective-bargaining agreements in Germany 
set a relatively high minimum wage and ensure 
an adequate basic compensation. In contrast, the
second HRM criteria, variable compensation is
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not generally fulfilled, as effective wages are not
much higher than the collectively set ones (Hardes
and Uhly, 1996). In banking, for example, the
wage drift is only about 10%. Furthermore, most
of this drift is distributed on a collective basis in
the form of extra salaries. Individual bonuses 
for tariff employees are relatively small (Muller,
1997a). In the chemical industry individual bonuses,
particularly for blue-collar workers, have nothing
to do with performance. They are paid to com-
pensate for job conditions such as excessive noise,
and to reduce differences between the pay of
white and blue-collar workers. Only two of the
sample firms pay a monthly bonus that is based
on an appraisal. 
Some of the firms had recently attempted to
make the remuneration of tariff staff more
performance-related. This was not an easy task, 
as employee representatives have strong co-
determination rights in grading as well as the
introduction and operation of company-specific
remuneration systems. In general, works coun-
cillors are critical about any moves from collect-
ive to individual and/or performance-related pay
when they fear that this will increase pressure on
their constituents, or will even lead to a reduction
in pay. Hoechst, for example, wanted to change 
its traditional system of fixed bonuses to a
performance-related one. This was initially opposed
by the works council. Eventually a compromise
was agreed that only part of the bonus will de-
pend on the individual’s performance, measured
by an appraisal. Moreover, the system was phased
in over some years, so that no employee will lose
money. In another sample firm, employee repre-
sentatives completely resisted attempts by man-
agement to change an existing fixed-bonus system
into a performance-related one. 
Compared to tariff employees, companies have
more freedom in regard to exempt pay. Five of the
16 sample firms use an analytical job evaluation
system to determine the base salary of exempts,
two of them only introduced these in the early
1990s. The informants in the remaining companies,
who were usually exempts themselves, were not
able or willing to discuss their company’s system
for the determination of exempt pay in more
detail. Pay for exempts appears to be a taboo
topic in these firms. German experts confirmed
this observation by suggesting that exempt pay is
normally the exclusive task of senior management
(Zander and Hoppe, 1990, p. 304). 
With the exception of three sample firms, all
others pay an annual bonus to their exempts. The
extent of this bonus is normally determined by
senior line managers, who get a budget for this
purpose. The criteria for the distribution of the
bonus are usually the individual performance and
the economic success of the company or business
unit. In banks, the title of the manager is also an
important factor in the equation. None of the
companies in the sample handed out data about
the extent of these bonuses. Nevertheless, an
indication is German salary surveys. They found
that variable pay in German firms increases with
the hierarchical level. Those at the top get, on
average, about 16% of their total annual salary 
as a variable bonus (Handelsblatt 1993, p. K1;
Seyfried, 1994, p. 141). This is relatively small in
comparison to the USA and the UK (Leichtfub
and Bonacker, 1992). However, in 1994, West LB
was increasing variable pay for exempts, and
Deutsche Bank announced to make exempt pay
more performance-related. Hypo Bank was plan-
ning to introduce a more performance-related
pay system for exempts in 1996. A growing im-
portance of performance-related pay in German
firms also emerged from the 1992 and 1995 Cran-
field surveys (Brewster and Hegewisch, 1994,
Table 4.2a; Weber and Kabst, 1996, p. 32).
Although exempt pay is hardly affected by
collective bargaining, remuneration decisions for
this group of employees are constrained by co-
determination. In one of the sample firms the
works council prevented the introduction of a
formal job-evaluation system for exempts. In
other sample firms, it influences its design and
controls its operation. Even if there is no formal
system of pay determination, the works council has
an influence on exempt remuneration. Employee
representatives, for example, have the right to see
the pay lists for all non-executive staff. In one of
the chemical firms, employee representatives
perceived a bonus system, which was entirely based
on the discretion of supervisors, as too arbitrary
and demanded to base the determination of the
bonus on objective criteria. Because management
and works council did not reach an agreement, a
conciliation committee (Einigungsstelle) was set
up. This consists of equal number of employer
and employee representatives, and is chaired by
an independent figure. It can issue binding rules.
In the case reported here, management was
forced to accept a system that allocates the bonus
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according to points, which exempts can earn by
working in projects or on extra tasks. Addition-
ally, the works council got the concession that
only the number of points earned, but not the
level of basic pay or the hierarchical level, play a
role in the allocation of the bonus. 
Concluding this section, it seems that basic
compensation levels are adequate. In contrast,
performance-related pay has so far not been
widely implemented in German firms. This assess-
ment is not only valid for tariff employees, whose
remuneration is to a large extent determined by
collective bargaining, but also for exempts, who
are not directly covered by it. However, it appears
that the ideology of performance-related pay has
had some impact on managers. Several of the firms
in the sample have attempted to link pay more to
performance by introducing analytical job evalu-
ation for exempts, by changing fixed bonuses into
variable ones and by linking merit increases and
bonuses to an appraisal scheme.  
Communication
An important element of HRM should be
intensive employee communication (Storey, 1992,
p. 35). The assumption is that this leads to a
greater commitment of the workforce, which in
turn is expected to enhance motivation and
performance (Guest, 1987, p. 513). The following
analysis will look separately at bottom-up, top-
down and two-way communication. It concen-
trates on more formal methods, as more detailed
studies would be needed to study informal com-
munication. Regarding the flow down, a company
practising HRM will inform all staff with tech-
niques such as formal mission statements, in-
house journals, annual reports and team briefings.
Although these are not HRM innovations, their
widespread application would indicate that em-
ployee communication has a high priority. For the
flow up we expect to find attitude surveys. Em-
ployee meetings will be used as a means of two-
way direct communication. 
Starting with top-down communication, 13 of
the sample firms have management guidelines
(Führungsgrundsätze) and/or mission statements
(Unternehmensleitbilder). Whereas the manage-
ment guidelines collected normally prescribe a
cooperative–participative leadership style, mis-
sion statements have a broader focus, and usually
only refer briefly to leadership style. In contrast
to mission statements that originated in the USA,
management guidelines are a particular German
feature that intends to foster a change from an
autocratic leadership style traditionally prevalent
in German firms, to a cooperative–participative
one (Grunwald and Lilge, 1982). The widespread
use of this communication tool in large companies
is supported by survey evidence (Gabele, 1992,
p. 39; Gaugler and Wiltz, 1993, Table 8; Wirth and
Beck, 1986, p. 137; Wunderer and Klimecki,
1990). A second popular means of downward
communication are in-house journals (Firmen-
zeitschriften). All but two of the sample firms
have such journals, some of them running for a
long time. When the researcher asked about other
downward communication techniques, circulars,
noticeboards, off-the-job training courses and
videos were mentioned. Henkel and Hoechst
also produce regular reports for special target
groups such as managers and first line super-
visors. Team briefings, which are widely used in
the UK (Ramsay, 1992, pp. 222–223), were not
mentioned. 
In contrast to top-down communication, which
primarily aims to bring the views of management
to the attention of the workforce, bottom-up
communication informs management about the
views of staff. Whereas in the past bottom-up
communication was largely informal, recently
more formal means such as attitude surveys have
become important. Ten sample firms have con-
ducted comprehensive or representative attitude
surveys of their workforce. Three more have car-
ried out surveys of particular groups of employees
only. Turning to two-way communication, ten of
the sample firms have employee meetings organ-
ized by management. These are usually held at
the branch or departmental level. Since 1992,
Veba Oil has, for example, regular meetings of all
employees of certain departments with a board
member. 
Nine of the 18 sample firms have only in the
1990s started to use one or more of the direct com-
munication techniques discussed above. Further-
more, during this time, Deutsche Bank and
Dresdner Bank established units within their
central HR departments that are responsible for
focusing employee communication. It therefore
appears that over recent years, direct communica-
tion has become more important. Confirming
these observations the 1992 Cranfield survey
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found that half of the firms surveyed in Germany
have increased verbal and/or written direct
communication (Brewster and Hegewisch, 1994,
Table 6.6). 
Turning to institutional constraints, some of the
sample firms involved employee representatives
in the design of attitude surveys, although it is still
an open legal question whether management is
required to get the approval of the works council
for a survey questionnaire (Breisig, 1990). More
important than this is that the co-determination
law not only stipulates that management shares
information with employee representatives, but
also gives them several means to communicate
with the workforce. Legal regulations make fre-
quent contacts between works councils and senior
managers compulsory. Whereas at the company
level the central works councils negotiate with
top management, at the establishment level,
works councils deal with local line and HR man-
agers. Considering the important role of the works
council in the communication process, it is not
surprising that the 1992 Cranfield survey found
that, after the immediate supervisor, the works
council is the second most important means of
bottom-up communication used by organizations
in Germany (Gaugler and Wiltz, 1993, Table 37). 
In addition to an intensive two-way communi-
cation between senior management and employee
representatives, the law also stipulates frequent
two-way communication between the works
council and employees. An important instrument
for this are works meetings (Works Constitution
Act Section 42). These are regularly held in all
but one of the sample firms. This explains that
employee meetings organized by management are
usually confined to organizational units that do
not have their own works meetings such as small
branches or departments. Works meetings are
called by the works council and conducted by its
chairperson. All employees of the establishment
are entitled to participate. In some of the firms,
the researcher was explicitly told that works meet-
ings are part of the company’s communication
system. This is reinforced by the fact that they are
usually addressed by the most senior managers 
of the establishment. For instance, at the main
plants of Henkel, Hoechst and Merck, the works
meeting is addressed by the labour director or 
the board chairman. At these firms I also found
detailed reports about the gathering in the em-
ployee journal. 
One could expect that the observed increase 
in direct communication has lead to a parallel
decrease in indirect communication. The data pre-
sented does not confirm this. The reason may well
be that the co-determination law deters companies
from neglecting indirect communication. A senior
works councillor, when asked about his position
with regard to employee meetings organized by
management, suggested that he and his colleagues
would object to a competitive event to the annual
works meeting. As employee representatives have
rights that would allow them to stop such meet-
ings, management has to be careful not to use
them as a means to threaten the works council.
Other employee representatives interviewed also
did not seem to be threatened by an increase in
direct communication, as management needs the
consent of the works council for the introduction
and operation of most direct communication tech-
niques. Hence it is sensible for management to
involve works councillors in their design and
operation. The observation that in German firms
direct communication has not been increased at
the expense of indirect communication is again
confirmed by the 1992 Cranfield survey. Whereas
only 3% of the firms surveyed claimed to have
decreased communication through the works coun-
cil, about one-third claimed to have increased it
(Brewster and Hegewisch, 1994, Table 6.4)
In conclusion, the evidence presented in this
section indicates that employee communication
has a high priority in the sample firms. This is at
least partly a result of institutional pressures. The
existence of works councils ensures that there is
at least some employee communication. In addition
to frequent encounters between works councillors
and senior managers, regular works meetings 
are also used for this purpose. Traditionally, direct
communication instruments were not widely
used. In the early 1990s, most of the firms in the
sample have increased direct communication by
introducing techniques such as attitude surveys,
works meetings organized by management and/or
mission statements. So far, this increase in direct
communication has not been at the expense of
indirect communication. 
Quality improvement techniques
Quality improvement techniques such as sug-
gestion schemes, quality circles and Total Quality
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Management (TQM) have been recognized as
important elements of HRM, as they can enhance
the quality of performance and lead to a stronger
involvement of the workforce (Guest, 1991, p. 154;
Legge, 1995, pp. 214–220). Suggestion schemes are
clearly not a distinctive HRM innovation. Never-
theless, they can contribute to the HRM outcomes
of commitment and quality. All sample firms
operate suggestion schemes, Dresdner Bank and
Hoechst since the 1930s. Quality circles became
popular in Germany in the early 1980s, when
there was a debate about how German firms can
compete with and learn from Japan (Breisig,
1990). Quality circles are much less widespread in
the sample firms than suggestion schemes. Only
one bank and three chemical firms operate
quality circles. Four of the chemical firms had
quality circles in the past. The fact that they do
not use them any more could indicate that the
quality-circle euphoria is over. 
TQM is widely seen as a better and more com-
prehensive succession concept to quality circles
(Hill, 1991). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, all
indigenous chemical firms in the sample issued
quality principles, which were inspired by the
TQM philosophy. Some of them also established
quality departments. However, quality seems to
be a technical task to ensure the high quality of
the end product, rather than the encompassing
cultural change envisaged by the TQM philoso-
phy. This is different in the two USA firms in the
sample. In 1994, Citibank and Procter & Gamble
introduced comprehensive TQM schemes.
The co-determination law explicitly mentions
suggestion schemes as an area where employee
representatives have co-determination rights. This
explains that the sample firms usually have one or
more works councillors on the committee that
decides about the acceptance of a suggestion and
the value of the bonus paid. According to a senior
works councillor of one of the chemical firms, their
company only has a suggestion scheme, as the
employee representatives have forced manage-
ment to install it. Management only agreed after
the works council won an injunction via the con-
ciliation committee. The operation of quality cir-
cles is also often regulated by works agreements
(Breisig, 1991). The works agreement of Shell’s
German subsidiary, for example, prescribes that
meetings of quality circles are only to be held dur-
ing working hours. It also gives assurances that
there will be no discrimination, for example in pay
or appraisal assessments, against those who do not
take part and confirms the co-determination rights
of the works council (Witzig and Breisig, 1994). 
To conclude this section, whereas the chemical
firms in the sample have introduced elements of
TQM, the quality management of German banks
still appears to be confined to the traditional
instruments such as suggestion schemes. Although
the co-determination law only makes direct refer-
ence to suggestion schemes, works councils also
have a say in the introduction and operation of
quality circles and TQM schemes.
Discussion of results
The paper has examined the HR techniques 
used by 16 firms operating in Germany. Aims
were to discover whether HRM prescriptions are
fulfilled, whether there is a development towards
HRM and what influence German labour-market
institutions have? The results are summarized 
in Table 2. It reports that in three of the seven
policy areas examined, most firms in the sample
appear to fulfil HRM criteria. For some of them
we observed a development towards HRM in 
the 1990s. In all policy areas analysed, German
labour-market institutions play a role and influ-
ence HR policies. 
HRM techniques can be divided into those
which are supported by German labour-market
institutions and those that are potentially incom-
patible with them. HRM techniques are relatively
widespread in the areas of training, employment
stability and employee communication. This is
hardly surprising, as German labour-market in-
stitutions exert pressures on companies to provide
extensive training, emphasize internal commun-
ication and guarantee employment security. For
instance, the initial vocational training system
provides incentives to offer training, and the exist-
ence of works councils ensures at least some degree
of employee communication. Hence, central tenets
of the HRM literature are in line with the require-
ments of German labour-market institutions. 
In the 1990s, developments towards HRM
prescriptions have taken place in the areas of
appraisal, quality improvement techniques, direct
communication and performance-related pay.
Here German companies traditionally practise
little HRM. Obviously there is more room to
introduce or extend elements of HRM in those
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areas which have been neglected in the past than
in those where German companies have already
practised HRM for a long time. Nevertheless, it
is remarkable that it has been possible for
management to introduce HRM techniques such
as goal-based appraisal, attitude surveys and
performance-related pay that are not necessarily
welcomed by unions and works councils. This
development suggests that there is room for the
introduction of HRM elements that are not
clearly supported by the German system.
Nevertheless, in firms with works councils, most
of these changes have to be negotiated with em-
ployee representatives. Thus a narrowly unitarist
approach can generally not be followed by com-
panies complying with the requirements of German
labour-market institutions. This also explains why
techniques such as performance-related pay that
are generally not appreciated by employee repre-
sentatives are primarily introduced in areas where
the influence of institutional features is not so
strong, as in the management of managerial staff.
Hence, the relationship between management
and works council is crucial. A low trust relation-
ship can result in restricted flexibility (i.e. the works
council does not agree to overtime requests),
change taking a long time (i.e. there are long
negotiations about works agreements) and a large
amount of management time being consumed by
negotiations with the works council (Kotthoff,
1994). As such a behaviour can severely disrupt
the smooth running of an enterprise, employers’
associations and business administration aca-
demics advise companies to use cooperation and
involvement strategies in their dealings with the
works council (von Eckardstein, 1997; Niedenhoff,
1990). 
In contrast to labour-market institutions, the
impact of industry appears to be less important.
Different workforce structures, products and reces-
sional influences explain that banks practise more
HRM in the areas of training and employment
stability, whereas chemical firms do more in regard
to quality improvement techniques. However, these
differences are only minimal. They might have
been more pronounced if I had not compared two
high-skill sectors. For instance, different results
may have been expected if we had included a low-
skill industry such as catering or retail. There were
also no major differences between the foreign-
owned and the indigenous sample firms. These
only emerge if one includes foreign-owned firms
that do not comply with German labour-market
institutions (Muller, 1998).
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Table 2. HRM and the companies in the sample
HRM criteria Fulfilment of HRM criteria More widespread (Ú ) Impact of Impact of 
in most companies in use of HRM practices industry institutions
the sample in the 1990s
Selection and induction Ú initial vocational 
training
works council – 
Training 3 banks + initial vocational
training + 
Appraisal Ú works council –
Employment stability 3 chemical initial vocational 
firms – training +
works council +
Pay Ú collective bargaining –
works council –
Communication 3 Ú works council +
Quality improvement Ú chemical works council –
techniques firms +
Note: Blanks indicate that criteria are not fulfilled or that the impact of an explanatory factor is not important, +(–) indicate
that either industry or any of the three labour-market institutions studied has a positive (negative) impact on the use of HRM
practices.
Conclusion
This paper examined the management of human
resources in Germany. In contrast to previous
research which suggests that companies operating
in Germany are low users of HRM, this research
found that several of the techniques associated
with HRM are widely used. Partly the German
system encourages the implementation of some
HRM practices. For example, the system of initial
vocational training contributes to a relatively high
emphasis on training. Co-determination exerts
some pressure on German companies to guarantee
employment security. Furthermore, over the last
decade, the companies that participated in the
case studies introduced HRM techniques such as
development-assessment centres, performance-
related pay and attitude surveys that were not
used in the past. Thus rejecting the notion that
HRM techniques are incompatible with German
labour-market institutions, a pluralist version of
HRM appears to be quite compatible with the
highly-regulated German context (Muller, 1999b).
This finding is in line with research from the UK
which suggests that HRM can work in union firms
(see for example, Storey and Sisson, 1993; Wood
and Menezes, 1998). 
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